Atlantic Conference on Eyjafjallajökull and Aviation

First Session – What Happened and What Needs to Be Done?

Association of European Airlines

The Association Of European Airlines

AEA member airlines' brands give credibility and weight to the Association…

AEA leverages this weight and gives it back, multiplied, to each individual member.

35 member airlines
340 million passengers
11,200 flights a day
630 destinations in 160 countries
5.5 million tonnes of cargo
383,000 employees
Total turnover of €70 billion

Practically All European Airspace Was Closed



Timeline: the Overview

20 Mar: First eruption of Eyjafjallajökull

14 Apr: Second eruption of Eyjafjallajökull

19 Apr: Eurocontrol meeting introducing "three-zone" concept

22 Apr: EASA First Safety Information Bulletin

23 May: EASA Second Safety Information Bulletin

March | April 2010 | May

Crisis Period

15 Apr: National authorities decide to close airspace

20 Apr: National authorities decide to gradually re-open airspace

8-9 May: Airspace closure in Southern Europe

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What Actually Happened During the Crisis Period?

- The **Icelandic Met service** monitored the volcanic activity of the Mount Eyjafjallajökull, and provided data input to VAAC London
- The **London VAAC** produced advisories (*i.e.* maps) indicating the location of the ash cloud
- **Eurocontrol** circulated the charts to the national authorities
- **National authorities** took decisions to close air space based on the information provided by the London VAAC
- **Airlines** seriously questioned the accuracy of the data. Verification flights showed no boroscopic evidence of safety-relevant quantities of volcanic ash.

The London VAAC Used a Disputed Model…

- **The forecast s were not confirmed by airlines' test flights**
  - No test flights, operated by AEA carriers, revealed any safety concerns
- **The forecasts were not confirmed by VAAC Toulouse**
  - On 9th May, France opened its airspace based on data provided by the VAAC Toulouse, which differed from VAAC London's data
- **The model was not supported by empirical data from WSI**





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The total and protracted closure of air space was disproportionate to the actual safety risk

- Costly – very costly – to AEA Carriers
- Disruptive – very disruptive – to European businesses, economies and tourism and to all travelers
- The duration and extent of the air space closures were based upon computer simulations
- The crisis was followed by chaos, not crisis management control and command, and exposed weaknesses in the decision making process of governing bodies

The Volcanic Ash Crisis Is Not Over

- **It could happen again (and again) if we do not fix deficiencies**

Past	Now	Future	
Operational Crisis Stage	*Status Quo*	*Political Fixes*	*Airline Compensation*
▶ Governments abdicated responsibility to VAAC London ▶ Closure of airspace based on 'computer models', not enough real-time data ▶ Result: 'Political safety' exulted over aviation and consumer safety	▶ Data quality remains insufficient ▶ Differentiated zone approach pursued by ECTL and EASA very complex and different interpretations persist ▶ EACCC functional?	▶ Continued substance-based criticism of VAAC London ▶ ECTL Option 2 being pushed by industry, but not reality, no time plan for migration ▶ Crisis management network to be developed	▶ Airlines paid customers for effects of 'Act of God' ▶ and demand compensation for 'Acts of Government'

AEA's Proposed Alternatives Towards a 'New European Approach'

- Promote better and more focused exchange of experience with non-European experts: volcanoes do not only erupt in Europe!
- Aircraft operators dispose of significant experience in risk management. Avoidance of ash-contaminated areas falls within this category;
- Aircraft operators need accurate scientific data and real-time information as basis for risk assessment;
- The decision-making process must be based upon a clear understanding of the roles of each player;
- In the short term, Europe needs functional crisis management cells; Structurally Europe needs a Single Sky!